Presidentialism or premiership: why the government has chosen the second option

Presidentialism or premiership: why the government has chosen the second option

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In the beginning there was presidentialism, or rather French-style semi-presidentialism. An old fascination of the Speaker of the Chamber Gianfranco Fini, the French institutional solution was also the one that prevailed in the end in the Bicameral chaired by Massimo D’Alema in 1997/98 before being wrecked by Silvio Berlusconi’s step backwards. And the wording “direct election of the President of the Republic” is also found in the third point of the centre-right’s common program for the last general elections.

The afterthought: the super partes role of the Quirinale cannot be touched

For months already, however (see Il Sole 24 Ore of 8 December), in Palazzo Chigi we have been oriented towards a form of premiership, abandoning the idea of ​​touching the figure of the Head of State. In fact, there are several advantages of the premiership over presidentialism: in the meantime, the introduction of the direct election of the head of government and the strengthening of his powers involves the modification of a few articles of the Constitution with respect to the direct election of the President of the Republic, which in addition to attributing to the Head of State some specific government powers that he does not currently have, starting with his presence at the European Council, it should be balanced with a series of counter-powers (for example, an elected and therefore biased president could no longer preside over the CSM). Furthermore, the role of guarantor and super partes institution of the Head of State in a country so politically divided with Italy would not undergo any changes. And at Palazzo Chigi they are well aware of how the Quirinale is the institution that has enjoyed the greatest trust from Italians for many years.

The «government of the Prime Minister» in thesis number 1 of Prodi’s Ulivo

Finally, last but not least, the premiership is also the proposal of the Third Pole by Carlo Calenda and Matteo Renzi (the “Mayor of Italy”) and it is a less difficult reform than presidentialism as well for the Democratic Party, at least for its part “reformist”. On the other hand, “the government of the Prime Minister” was already in thesis number 1 of Romano Prodi’s Ulivo in 1996: “It appears appropriate in our country to adopt a form of government centered on the figure of the Prime Minister invested following the parliamentary vote of confidence in line with the guidelines of the electorate. To this end, on the electoral ballot, the indication – alongside the candidate of the single-member constituency – of the party or coalition to which he/she adheres and of the candidate for prime minister designated by them must be provided. According to the models in force in other countries where the form of government is oriented around the Prime Minister, it seems appropriate to give life to a constitutional convention according to which a change in the majority of government usually requires, and in any case in a short time, the dissolution of the political chamber and the use of new elections. Conversely, it remains possible to replace the Premier within the same majority with the method of constructive distrust».

German model for strengthening the premier’s powers

And it is clear that Meloni has an interest in involving at least a part of the opposition: Renzi’s warning during the debate on trust (“I advise against proceeding with a majority, I know something about it…”) still resonates loud and clear. Therefore, on the table of the technicians of Palazzo Chigi and of the Ministry of Reforms led by the force activist Elisabetta Casellati, there is already a package of changes which first of all provides for the strengthening of the premier’s powers, starting with the possibility of revoking ministers and constructive distrust . However, constructive distrust is not enough. It is no coincidence that in Germany itself it was used only once. More effective is the introduction of the prime minister’s power to request and obtain early elections in the event of a defeat on confidence, also envisaged in Germany and used in the past by chancellors Brandt, Kohl and Schroeder.

Which electoral law? The hypothesis of a revisited Italicum

As for the electoral law, it is clear that the premiership works if there is a certain majority and with the current Rosatellum it is not certain: if the Italians’ vote on 25 September was clear, it was not the case in 2018, when the result uncertain resulted in grand coalitions between opponents. The solution on the table of the majority is therefore that of a proportional system with a majority bonus: the Consulta has already established that it is compliant with the Constitution to assign 54% of the seats to those who obtain 40% of the votes, nor has it precluded forms of national ballot if no one reaches this threshold as long as new appearances are possible between the first and second round. The idea, for a smile of history, is therefore that of a Renziano Italicum revisited taking into account the sentences of the Consulta in the meantime

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