Because it is not true that science and democracy are at odds

There are often voices accusing scientists of lacking democracy, but scientific debate is not necessarily at odds with democratic debate. Since I have already written several times on this topic, I would like once again to try to clarify some fundamental concepts that may escape those who are not experts in scientific matters, even if they have more knowledge in other fields such as art, literature, philosophy or law. In a democracy, it is indisputable that the right of expression is fundamental. However, this does not imply that all opinions are of equal value. Ultimately, it is up to democratic institutions to decide which opinions should have influence in relation to a given issue.

There are even unlawful opinions: if I were to claim to defend the position that it is right to discriminate against the Jews and send them to crematoria or to crucify Christians as in the time of Nero, I would probably be committing a crime, because this type of opinion is recognized as so dangerous, as to deserve censure and punishment. Apart from these few extreme cases, in a democracy we essentially resort to counting the heads who share a certain thesis, through the expression of a vote, both universal and delegated. This, however, does not happen for every question raised, even when a certain opinion is not clearly illegitimate; parliamentary records are filled with the expression of opinion of individuals, which has not resulted in votes or other decision-making processes.

That is, there is a series of rules for evaluating what is worth discussing and on which one must decide, even before going into the merits, and there are opinions judged not worthy of discussion. The set of rules for deciding which opinions are illicit, which are irrelevant and which deserve discussion, and finally which ones we deem right and which can form the basis of a decision, is precisely the very essence of our democratic debate.

If it were really necessary to discuss every opinion in order to live in a democracy, democracy could only be a chimera. Once these few elements have been established, let’s try to examine the discussion of opinions of a scientific nature, made by scientists. First of all, in a scientific discussion only a certain type of opinion, or thesis can be discussed: those that are amenable to investigation through the collection and analysis of experimental facts (unless they can be derived through a logical procedure -mathematics from well-established assumptions). Because? For the simple reason that scientific opinions are weighed not on the basis of heads, but on the basis of the facts that support them. It is not people who are questioned, but the physical world; and the procedure, which in democracy is that established by electoral rules and parliamentary voting, in science is that established by the experimental and statistical methods to which one must submit so that the “facts” can be weighed, just as the electoral rules serve to weigh the votes.

This constraint leads to discarding from the discussion many of the ideas of improvised scientific interlocutors, who believe it is sufficient to state something to have the right to debate, who then in the frustration of not receiving an answer accuse the scientists of “close-mindedness”.. Just as the vote is not expressed at random during an election – for example, one does not write on the walls, but one proceeds through an electoral booth and a certification, in order to weigh the consensus for a given political thesis – so it happens that, in science , forming an opinion requires doing so in a way that can be weighed and evaluated by the scientific method.
Furthermore, the facts to be discussed cannot come from random readings or experiences, perhaps from Google, but only from the application of a method for their collection and a statistical analysis for determining their strength, just as for deciding which opinion prevails in Parliament is not proceeded by sentiment, but on the basis of predetermined regulations and methods.

Anything that is below this minimum standard, but is heralded for example on the strength of the opinion of some illustrious person – even a Nobel Prize winner – whom we believe to be worthy of trust, cannot be accepted or discussed, for the simple reason that it doesn’t matter who says something. Not even in the bar, let alone in democratic or scientific institutions, do we listen to someone just for their name; it is not a question of lack of democracy, but simply of irrelevance of the principle of authority.

When, once a scientific opinion has been correctly formulated and the data supporting it, the scientific discussion can begin, it is necessary to be prepared to examine which of two or more hypotheses, each accompanied by facts, is the best. There are methods for this too, which I won’t stay here to discuss, but whose basic element is this: to find an experimental verification method that gives sufficiently (in a statistical sense) different results, according to which of the two or more hypotheses is better. Note that I deliberately use the term better, not true: because every thesis, however supported by data, may one day encounter even a single fact capable of demolishing it. Until that day, and in the absence of better hypotheses that also agree with that fact and with all those previously explained by the unsuccessful hypothesis, however, each hypothesis enjoys the status of “scientific truth”, with that sense of provisional nature inherent in the method.

And this “scientific truth” is what we can derive from the analysis of the technical literature on a certain topic (not from a single article); and it is necessary to adhere to this, measuring its solidity (i.e. number of supporting facts and experiences), utility (i.e. ability to make useful predictions on a more or less large scale, for the purposes that one sets out to achieve) and finally compatibility with the rest of scientific knowledge. In short: if a certain opinion is not discussed by researchers, and if the argument is of a scientific nature, first ask ourselves if it is really questionable, instead of believing that the problem is the lack of democracy. After all, there could be a new way of formulating our thoughts, this one so interesting and worthy of discussion, without disturbing philosophy, democracy and the right to opinion.